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Abstract 
A core requirement for imitation is a capacity to solve the correspondence problem; to map 
observed onto executed actions, even when observation and execution yield sensory inputs in 
different modalities and coordinate frames.  Until recently, it was assumed that the human 
capacity to solve the correspondence problem is innate.  However, it is now becoming 
apparent that, as predicted by the associative sequence learning model, experience, and 
especially sensorimotor experience, plays a critical role in the development of imitation.  We 
review evidence from studies of nonhuman animals, children, and adults, focussing on 
research in cognitive neuroscience that uses training and naturally occurring variations in 
expertise to examine the role of experience in the formation of the mirror system.  The 
relevance of this research depends on the widely held assumption that the mirror system plays 
a causal role in generating imitative behaviour.  We also report original data supporting this 
assumption.  These data show that theta-burst transcranial magnetic stimulation of the 
inferior frontal gyrus, a classical mirror system area, disrupts automatic imitation of finger 
movements. We discuss the implications of the evidence reviewed for the evolution, 
development and intentional control of imitation. 
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In order to imitate an action the imitator must translate a sensory representation of the action 
she observes into her own motor program for that action. Despite the apparent ease with 
which we imitate others – i.e. reproduce the topography of their body movements – this 
translation poses a significant computational challenge, particularly since the observation of 
the actor and the execution of an action by an imitator often result in sensory inputs in 
different modalities and frames of reference. This challenge is known as the correspondence 
problem (Brass & Heyes, 2005). It is most clearly illustrated when the actor performs a 
perceptually opaque action, such as shrugging the shoulders (Heyes & Ray, 2000); an action 
in which the sensory input the imitator receives from observing the actor is highly dissimilar 
to that which she receives when performing the action herself. The problem persists, 
however, when the actor performs a perceptually transparent action, such as clapping, which 
yields similar perceptual inputs when observed and executed: the imitator needs to determine 
which motor commands to use in order to reproduce, from a third-party perspective, the 
sensory consequences of the actor’s movement.  
 
It has been widely assumed that the human ability to solve the correspondence problem is 
innate (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977; Meltzoff & Moore, 1997; Meltzoff & Decety, 2003; Nagy 
et al., 2005; Nagy, 2006). This assumption is based primarily on data suggesting that 
newborn infants can imitate a range of different movements (discussed below). However, 
evidence is now accumulating in support of an alternative hypothesis: that the ability to solve 
the correspondence problem arises as a result of experience, and in particular sensorimotor 
experience, acquired during development. Heyes and Ray (2000; see also Heyes, 2001; Brass 
& Heyes, 2005) outlined an Associative Sequence Learning theory of imitation (ASL), which 
proposes that the correspondence problem is solved by a set of excitatory links, or matching 
vertical associations, each connecting a sensory and a motor representation of the same 
action.  These links are formed in the course of development via standard processes of 
associative learning (Schultz & Dickinson, 2000).  Learning of this kind occurs when the 
individual receives sensorimotor experience in which the observation and execution of a 
particular action, X, are correlated or contingent; i.e. when a sensory representation of X, 
activated by movement observation, is more likely to be active at the same time as a motor 
representation of X than at the same time as a motor representation of any other action.  
Sensorimotor experience of this kind, i.e. imitogenic experience, comes from direct and 
mirror-mediated self-observation, from socially synchronous action, and from being imitated 
(Heyes & Ray, 2000; Ray & Heyes, under review).  
 
This paper has four parts.  The first examines the evidence from behavioural studies (of 
nonhuman animals, infants and adults) indicating that imitation depends on sensorimotor 
learning.  The second reports original data showing that, in adult humans, imitation is 
mediated by the mirror system.  These data confirm that the studies reviewed in the third 
section, reporting experiential effects on the mirror system, provide further support for the 
view that imitation is made possible by sensorimotor learning.  The final section examines 
the implications of the ASL theory of imitation.  
 
Sensorimotor learning and imitation 
Nonhuman animals 
Nativist accounts of imitation suggest that specialized processes solve the correspondence 
problem, that they have been shaped by natural selection for the role that they play in 
imitation, and that they are present only in humans or in closely related species (Meltzoff & 
Decety, 2003; Nagy, 2006; Meltzoff, 2007). The ASL theory, in contrast, predicts that 
imitation is likely to occur in a variety of species, to the extent that sensorimotor experience 
of the imitated actions was available during development. While early studies of imitation in 
non-human animals were beset with methodological problems (see Tomasello, Davis-
Dasilva, Camak, & Bard, 1987; Whiten & Ham, 1992), recent data (see also Huber et al., 
2009) provide compelling evidence for imitation of simple movements across a range of 
species, including chimpanzees (Custance, Whiten, & Bard, 1995; Whiten et al., 1996; 
Whiten, Horner, Litchfield, & Marshall-Pescini, 2004), marmosets (Bugnyar & Huber, 1997; 
Voelkl & Huber, 2007), dogs (Slabbert & Rasa, 1997; Range, Viranyi, & Huber, 2007), and 
several bird species (Lefebvre, Templeton, Brown, & Koelle, 1997; Campbell, Heyes, & 
Goldsmith, 1999; Mui, Haselgrove, Pearce, & Heyes, 2008). For example, dogs will perform 
a paw-press action to obtain a food reward, rather than the usually preferred mouth action, 
after observing a demonstrator dog using this action (Range et al., 2007). These data indicate 
that the ability to solve the correspondence problem is not unique to humans, but they also 
suggest, consistent with the ASL theory, that this ability is limited to a small range of actions: 
those actions with which animals are likely to have obtained sensorimotor experience (e.g. 
Richards, Mottley, Pearce, & Heyes, in press). 
 
Infants 
Evidence that imitative behaviour is present from birth would clearly support a nativist 
account of imitation. Since the publication of a seminal paper on neonatal imitation (Meltzoff 
& Moore, 1977), it has been widely assumed that the ability to imitate is innate (see also 
Meltzoff & Moore, 1983; Meltzoff & Moore, 1989; Kugiumutzakis, 1999). However, recent 
reviews suggest that the only behaviour that is reliably imitated by newborns is tongue 
protrusion, and that this effect is mediated by an innate releasing mechanism or an oral 
exploratory response, rather than by the mechanisms that support imitation later in 
development (Anisfeld et al., 2001; Jones, 2006; 2009).  
 
Widespread acceptance of the nativist hypothesis has led research on imitation in post-
neonatal infancy to be neglected.  However, a recent review of studies examining the 
development of imitation in later infancy found evidence in support of three predictions made 
by the ASL theory (Ray & Heyes, under review).  First, the accuracy of imitation, and the 
range of behaviors that can be imitated, increase over time as individuals acquire more 
experience of seeing and doing the same actions (e.g. Abravanel, Levan-Goldschmidt, & 
Stevenson, 1976; Killen & Uzgiris, 1981; Masur, 2006; Jones, 2007).  Second, imitation of 
perceptually transparent actions precedes imitation of perceptually opaque actions only to the 
extent that infants are more likely to have had experience of seeing and doing the former than 
the latter (e.g. Piaget, 1952; Uzgiris, 1972; Kaye & Marcus, 1978). Third, variation in the 
development of imitation across infants depends on the amount of imitogenic experience the 
infants have received, and in particular on the quality of social interactions in which adult and 
infant commonly see and do the same action (e.g. Cress, Andrews, & Reynolds, 1998; Field 
et al., 2005; McEwen et al., 2007). 
 
Adults 
Experiments using stimulus-response compatibility paradigms have revealed that imitative 
behaviour can be automatic; we sometimes imitate the actions of others even when this 
behaviour is contrary to our intentions (Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschlager, & Prinz, 2000; 
Vogt, Taylor, & Hopkins, 2003; Kilner, Paulignan, & Blakemore, 2003; Press, Bird, Flach, & 
Heyes, 2005; Bertenthal, Longo, & Kosobud, 2006).  For example, in one of the earliest 
demonstrations of automatic imitation, Stürmer, Aschersleben and Prinz (2000; Experiments 
1, 5 and 6) showed that adult participants were faster to perform a hand opening action while 
viewing a compatible (hand opening) action, than when viewing an incompatible (hand 
closing) action, and that this effect was reversed for the performance of hand closing actions.  
The participants were instructed, and therefore presumably intended, to respond as fast as 
possible in all trials.  Therefore, this result implies that the sight of the action stimulus 
(opening or closing) primed an imitative response, and that the participants were unable to 
prevent this from speeding their responses in compatible trials and/or slowing their responses 
in incompatible trials. 
 
Several studies using a paradigm similar to that of Stürmer et al. (2000) have provided 
support for the ASL theory by showing that sensorimotor learning can enhance, abolish and 
even reverse automatic imitation.  Press, Gillmeister and Heyes (2007) found an enhancement 
effect in a study comparing the extent to which human and robotic hand movements elicit 
automatic imitation.  At pretest, robotic actions were less potent stimuli for automatic 
imitation than human action.  However, 24 hours after a relatively brief period of compatible 
sensorimotor training with the robotic movements – in which participants responded to robot 
hand opening stimuli by opening their hands, and to robot hand closing stimuli by closing 
their hands – the robotic movements elicited as much automatic imitation as the human 
movements.  In a complementary way, Heyes, Bird, Johnson and Haggard (2005) showed 
that incompatible sensorimotor training with human stimuli – in which participants responded 
to human hand opening by closing their hands, and to human hand closing by opening their 
hands – abolished automatic imitation.  Twenty-four hours after training of this kind, 
responding in incompatible trials was as fast as responding in compatible trials.  Gillmeister 
et al. (2008) demonstrated a comparable reduction in automatic imitation of hand and foot 
actions following incompatible sensorimotor experience, while Catmur, Walsh and Heyes 
(2007) showed that, in the case of little- and index- finger abduction movements, 
incompatible sensorimotor experience can reverse automatic imitation, producing a 
systematic, involuntary tendency to counter-imitate the observed action (see below).  On the 
basis of associative learning theory, incompatible sensorimotor training would be expected to 
establish new, nonmatching vertical associations, e.g. between a sensory representation of 
hand opening and a motor representation of hand closing (Elsner & Hommel, 2004), and to 
result in inhibitory learning weakening the effects of the old, matching vertical associations 
(Schultz & Dickinson, 2000).  
 
Each of the foregoing studies isolated the effects of sensorimotor experience (executing a 
particular action while observing the same or an alternative action) by controlling for the 
effects of sensory experience (repeated observation of an action) and of motor experience 
(repeated execution of an action).  For example, the performance of a group that received 
incompatible sensorimotor training (e.g. open stimulus – close response) was compared with 
that of a group that received compatible sensorimotor training (e.g. open stimulus – open 
response).  Thus, the experimental and control groups saw the stimulus actions equally often, 
and performed the response actions equally often, but automatic imitation was abolished or 
reversed only in the groups that received incompatible training.  Therefore, these studies 
show specifically that sensorimotor learning modulates automatic imitation.   
  
Imitation and the mirror system 
A number of recent studies, reviewed in the next section, have suggested that the human 
mirror system – a network of brain areas, in particular inferior frontal and inferior parietal 
cortices, active during both action perception and action execution (see Ferrari, Bonini, & 
Fogassi, 2009; Brass, Ruby, & Spengler, 2009; Bastiaansen, Thioux, & Keysers, 2009) – can 
be modified by experience.  These studies provide support for the ASL theory of imitation 
only if one assumes that imitation is, at least in part, mediated by the mirror system; that the 
mirror system is involved in solving the correspondence problem for imitation.  Although 
widely held, this assumption currently lacks direct empirical support.  In this section we 
survey existing evidence linking the mirror system with imitation, and present original data 
confirming that link.   
 
Studies of neuropsychological patients suggest a role for the mirror system in imitation (see 
also Rumiati, Carmo, & Corradi-Dell’Acqua, 2009), but they do not make clear which areas 
within the mirror system are critical. Lesions to the inferior parietal lobe, particularly in the 
left hemisphere, often result in apraxia – a deficit in miming gestures and in imitation 
(Wheaton & Hallett, 2007). Lesions to the inferior frontal cortex in apraxia are not as widely 
reported as are parietal lesions, and may not always result in imitation deficits: Goldenberg et 
al. (2007) found impairment in miming gestures following lesions to the left inferior frontal 
gyrus (IFG), but imitation was preserved in some of these patients. In a different study, 
imitation of finger movements was impaired following lesions to the left IFG, while left 
inferior parietal lesions resulted in impaired imitation of hand postures (Goldenberg & 
Karnath, 2006). Thus, the effect of lesions to parts of the mirror system on imitation may 
depend on lesion location and on the imitation task used. 
 
When using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate the neural 
mechanisms involved in imitation, well-controlled studies compare the blood oxygen level 
dependent (BOLD) response during imitation trials (when the performed action matches that 
which is observed) to the response in non-imitation trials (when the performed action is 
different from that observed).  When imitation trials are instead contrasted with an 
observation-only control or an execution-only control (Iacoboni et al., 1999; Tanaka & Inui, 
2002; Koski et al., 2003), any differences in response could be related to whichever element 
of the task (execution or observation) is absent from the control condition.  In studies 
comparing imitation with non-imitation trials, one would expect the BOLD response to be 
consistently stronger in imitation trials only if there is a specialised imitation mechanism 
mediated by the mirror system; if the mirror system is for imitation (Brass & Heyes, 2005).  
However, if the mirror system mediates the kind of general purpose mechanism postulated by 
the ASL model – a learned mechanism that can do imitation but is not for imitation – then, 
across studies, one would not expect consistent differences between imitation and non-
imitation trials.   In both cases, the BOLD response is likely to summate activation arising 
from neural populations that are sensitive to action observation (visual), to action execution 
(motor) and to both observation and execution (visuomotor).  In each imitation trial, all three 
of these sources of activation relate to the same action, A, whereas in non-imitation trials, two 
of them relate to an alternative action (e.g. visual and visuomotor activation relating to A, and 
motor activation relating to B).  The more concordant activation in imitation trials may 
contribute to imitative performance, but this would not be reflected in consistent differences 
between imitation and non-imitation trials because the BOLD response does not distinguish 
activation relating to different actions, A and B.  Consistent with this analysis, the small 
number of fMRI studies comparing imitation and non-imitation trials have yielded mixed 
results.  Newman-Norlund et al. (2007) found greater BOLD response in the mirror system 
during non-imitation than imitation trials, whereas Brass, Zysset and von Cramon (2001) 
found activity outside the mirror system for this contrast. Williams et al. (2007) did not 
replicate either of these results, but found more mirror system activity during imitation than 
non-imitation trials.   
 
Convergent evidence that a cognitive function depends on a particular brain area can be 
provided by disrupting the functioning of that area using repetitive transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (rTMS). In several studies, rTMS has been used to interfere with the functioning 
of the mirror system, in particular by targeting the IFG (Pobric & Hamilton, 2006; Avenanti, 
Bolognini, Maravita, & Aglioti, 2007; Urgesi, Candidi, Ionta, & Aglioti, 2007). The IFG is 
thought to be homologous with area F5, where mirror neurons have been found in the 
macaque (Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998). Only one experiment, however, has investigated the 
dependence of imitation on the mirror system using rTMS:  Heiser et al. (2003) reported that 
participants made more response location errors in a finger movement imitation task than in a 
control task during rTMS to the IFG, but not during occipital stimulation.  Heiser et al. did 
not find any effects of rTMS of the IFG on more subtle measures of perceptual-motor 
translation, i.e. response times, movement kinematics, or accuracy of finger selection.    
 
In the experiment reported below we investigated the role of the mirror system in imitation 
using a relatively new rTMS protocol, continuous theta burst stimulation, to disrupt IFG 
functioning during the performance of an automatic imitation task. Theta burst stimulation 
was used because it produces long-lasting effects on the brain after a short period of 
administration: 20 seconds of stimulation over primary motor cortex can reduce cortical 
excitability for 20 minutes following stimulation, allowing experiments to be performed 
subsequent to the administration of rTMS (Huang et al., 2005; Vallesi, Shallice, & Walsh, 
2007). In our experiment, we compared the effects of theta burst rTMS of the IFG, with 
stimulation of a control site – the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) – and a baseline, no rTMS 
condition, on automatic imitation performance.   
 
We selected an automatic imitation task, rather than an intentional imitation task of the kind 
used by Heiser et al. (2003), because automatic imitation tasks isolate the processes involved 
in perceptual-motor translation by minimising demands on working memory and other 
executive processes.  In the automatic imitation task used here, participants were required to 
make an abduction (outward) movement of the index finger or the little finger of their right 
hand in response to a coloured circle (e.g. orange stimulus – index response; purple stimulus 
– little response).  A task-irrelevant action stimulus, an image of an index or little finger 
abduction movement, was presented at the same time as the coloured circle.  In imitatively 
compatible trials, the action stimulus matched the correct response (e.g. index stimulus – 
index response), and in imitatively incompatible trials the action stimulus was the alternative 
to the correct response (e.g. little stimulus – index response).  The magnitude of the automatic 
imitation effect was measured by subtracting response times (RTs) in imitatively compatible 
trials from RTs in imitatively incompatible trials.  Our experimental design also varied, 
orthogonally, the left-right spatial relationship (compatible or incompatible) between the 
action stimulus and the response. This was in order to prevent participants from using the 
spatial location of the irrelevant movement stimulus as a response cue.  
 
If perceptual-motor translation for imitation depends on the left IFG, one would expect the 
automatic imitation effect to be reduced, relative to baseline, following theta burst rTMS to 
the IFG, but not following theta burst rTMS to the PPC. 
 
Methods 
Table 1 shows the stimuli presented and the responses made in trials of each type defined by 
imitative and spatial compatibility. Further information about the sequence of events in each 
trial and block composition is provided in Figure 1. See supplementary online information for 
detailed description of the methods. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Results 
The mean RT for the first block of trials in each condition (baseline, IFG, PPC), where the 
disruptive effects of theta burst stimulation are maximal, was calculated for each of the four 
trial types (spatially compatible, imitatively compatible; spatially compatible, imitatively 
incompatible; spatially incompatible, imitatively compatible; spatially incompatible, 
imitatively incompatible), collapsing across the two response movements (index and little 
finger movements). See Supplementary Table S1 for the RT data. 
 
A repeated-measures ANOVA was performed on the RT data with within-subjects factors of 
rTMS condition (baseline, IFG, PPC), spatial compatibility (compatible, incompatible) and 
imitative compatibility (compatible, incompatible). A significant main effect of rTMS 
condition was observed: participants were fastest in the IFG condition (473 ± 27 ms), 
followed by the PPC condition (486 ± 20 ms) and the baseline condition (517 ± 24 ms; 
F2,14 = 6.5, p = 0.01). Post-hoc t-tests (Bonferroni corrected: α = 0.0167) showed a trend 
towards a difference in RTs between the baseline and two rTMS conditions (baseline vs IFG, 
t7 = 3.0, p = 0.02; baseline vs PPC, t7 = 2.6, p = 0.04). This is likely to be due to a 
generalised arousal effect of rTMS (Wassermann et al., 1999; Koren et al., 2001; Drager et 
al., 2004). Significant main effects of spatial compatibility (F1,7 = 93.7, p < 0.001) and 
imitative compatibility (F1,7 = 7.5, p = 0.03) were also observed. None of the two-way 
interactions reached significance.  
Of principal interest, there was a significant three-way interaction between rTMS condition, 
spatial compatibility and imitative compatibility (F2,14 = 4.7, p = 0.03; see Figure 2). Simple 
interaction analysis revealed a significant two-way interaction between spatial and imitative 
compatibility in the IFG stimulation condition (F1,7 = 7.9, p = 0.03), but not in the other two 
conditions. This indicates that the automatic imitation effect was abolished under IFG 
stimulation in spatially compatible, but not in spatially incompatible, trials. In spatially 
compatible trials, the automatic imitation effect was significantly smaller in the IFG 
stimulation condition than in the baseline (t7 = 2.4, p = 0.05) and PPC (t7 = 3.4, p = 0.01) 
conditions. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Discussion 
The results of this experiment provide support for the hypothesis that the left IFG plays a 
causal role in perceptual-motor translation for imitation. Theta burst rTMS of the left IFG 
abolished the automatic imitation effect in trials where the correct response was spatially 
compatible with the irrelevant movement stimulus.  Comparable stimulation of the PPC had 
no effect on automatic imitation in either spatially compatible or spatially incompatible trials. 
 
The absence of an effect of rTMS of left IFG on the size of the automatic imitation effect in 
spatially incompatible trials was unexpected, but can be understood if one considers that 
spatially incompatible trials are associated with slower response times than spatially 
compatible trials (see Supplementary Table S1). This raises the possibility that, rather than 
blocking perceptual-motor translation entirely, the effect of rTMS of the left IFG is to delay 
this translation process. Supporting this hypothesis, a recent study found that 1-Hz rTMS to 
parietal cortex delayed the onset of the rubber hand illusion (Kammers et al., 2008). The 
result of delaying perceptual-motor translation in an imitation task would be a reduction in 
the automatic imitation effect in fast, i.e. spatially compatible, trials, but a preserved 
automatic imitation effect in slower, spatially incompatible, trials. Figure 3 illustrates the 
anticipated outcome of such a delay, in terms of the build-up and decay of the automatic 
imitation effect over time.  
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
We carried out a time-bin analysis to test this hypothesis. Trials in the three rTMS conditions 
were ordered by RT and divided into quintiles. ANOVA with factors of imitative 
compatibility (compatible, incompatible) and quintile (1, fastest, to 5, slowest) revealed an 
interaction between quintile and imitative compatibility in the IFG condition (F4,28 = 3.4, p = 
0.02), such that the automatic imitation effect recovered with increasing RT. This interaction 
was not present in the baseline (F4,28 = 0.1, p = 0.97) or PPC (F4,28 = 2.0, p = 0.13) conditions.  
 
We also conducted a behavioural follow-up experiment to test the delay hypothesis, in which 
the irrelevant movement stimulus was presented either simultaneously with, or 40 ms after, 
the coloured circle (see supplementary online information for further details of the method). 
The 40 ms condition simulated the effects of the hypothesised delay in processing of the 
irrelevant movement induced by rTMS to IFG.  Consistent with the delay hypothesis, 
analysis of the RT data from this follow-up study revealed an interaction between delay 
condition and spatial compatibility (F1,7 = 5.4, p = 0.05): the automatic imitation effect was 
smaller in spatially compatible trials in the 40 ms than the simultaneous condition (11 ± 6 ms 
compared to 22 ± 7 ms), but no effect of delay was observed on the automatic imitation effect 
in spatially incompatible trials (17 ± 5 ms compared to 15 ± 9 ms).  
 
Thus, the results of our experiment using theta burst rTMS suggest that interference with the 
left IFG, a classical mirror area, delays perceptual-motor translation in an automatic imitation 
task, and thereby provides stronger evidence than was previously available that the mirror 
system plays a causal role in generating imitative behaviour.  
 
Sensorimotor learning and the mirror system  
Having confirmed that imitation depends on the mirror system, we now turn to research in 
cognitive neuroscience that has used fMRI and TMS to investigate the effects of experience 
on the development of the mirror system. 
    
Functional magnetic resonance imaging 
Several studies have used fMRI to examine the effects of expertise and learning on mirror 
system activity during action observation.  Most of these studies provide compelling evidence 
that experience modulates the activity of the mirror system, but do not tell us whether sensory 
experience, motor experience, or sensorimotor experience is critical.  For example, Haslinger 
et al. (2005) contrasted observation of piano playing and non-piano playing finger 
movements in professional pianists and control participants, and showed that training as a 
pianist enhanced the blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) response to the observation of 
piano playing stimuli in areas including the left inferior frontal gyrus and bilateral inferior 
parietal cortices. Similarly, Margulis et al. (2009) found greater BOLD response in left 
premotor and inferior parietal cortices when musicians (flute or violin players) listened to a 
musical excerpt played on their instrument of expertise, compared to the other instrument.  
Since musicians have extensive experience of seeing and hearing their instrument being 
played (sensory experience), and playing their instrument (motor experience), and of seeing 
and hearing it played while performing the actions that produce these sensory inputs 
(sensorimotor experience), these effects could have been due to sensory, to motor or to 
sensorimotor experience.   
 
Vogt et al. (2007) investigated the observation and imitative performance of practiced and 
non-practiced guitar chords in expert and novice guitar players. In contrast with the previous 
studies (Haslinger et al., 2005; Margulis et al., 2009), they found that observation of practiced 
chords produced less activity in mirror system areas than the observation of non-practiced 
chords. This may have been due to the attentional demands of the task used by Vogt et al.: 
their participants were required to imitate the observed actions after observing them, and may 
therefore have paid more attention to the difficult-to-imitate non-practiced chords.  Providing 
less ambiguous evidence of an effect of experience (sensory, motor or sensorimotor), the 
study by Vogt et al. also indicated that, during chord observation, the guitarists showed 
greater activity than the non-guitarists in dorsal premotor cortex.  (The dorsal premotor cortex 
is not a classical mirror system area, but in this study it was active during both the 
observation and the production of chords, suggesting that it has mirror properties.)  
 
Focussing on dance rather than musical expertise, Cross, Hamilton and Grafton (2006) 
trained dancer participants to perform a new modern dance piece, and found, over five weeks 
of rehearsal and brain scanning sessions, that BOLD response in ventral premotor and 
inferior parietal areas during the observation of sequences from the piece was correlated with 
the dancers’ reported ability to perform the sequences.  This interesting result was taken to 
indicate that participants’ motor ability, which is likely to be an indicator of their motor 
experience, influences the mirror system response to observed actions.  However, during 
rehearsals the dancers received sensorimotor as well as motor experience – they not only 
performed the movements, but observed the visual consequences of their movements – and 
therefore it is not clear whether one or both of these types of experience were critical in 
modulating the mirror system response.   
 
Across two further studies of dance, Calvo-Merino and colleagues (2005; 2006) investigated 
the differences between visual and motor experience of a complex action on mirror system 
responses. Participants in these studies were capoeira dancers and male and female ballet 
dancers. Initially, the contrast was made between observing an action with which the 
participant was familiar and one that was unfamiliar to them: so capoeira dancers observed 
capoeira actions (familiar), contrasted with a visually similar ballet action (unfamiliar) while 
the contrast for the ballet dancers was the reverse. BOLD response in premotor and parietal 
areas was higher when observing the familiar movement than when observing the unfamiliar 
movement. However, this design confounds motor and visual familiarity: ballet dancers will 
have more visual experience, as well as more motor experience, of ballet moves. Therefore 
the second study contrasted male and female ballet moves: both genders would be equally 
visually familiar with both types of move, but each would have motor experience only of 
their own gender-specific moves. Left premotor cortex, as well as parietal and cerebellar 
areas, showed a greater BOLD response when participants viewed their own gender’s 
movements than when viewing those of the other gender. This suggests that visual experience 
of an action is less important than motor experience and/or sensorimotor experience in 
modulating mirror system responses to observation of that action.  However, like previous 
fMRI studies, this one did not isolate the roles of motor and sensorimotor experience in 
mirror system development.  During training, dancers use mirrors and observe other members 
of their troupe engaging in actions synchronized with their own.  Therefore, dancers receive 
more sensorimotor experience, as well as more motor experience, of own-gender than of 
other-gender moves as they acquire their expertise. 
 
Catmur et al. (2008) showed that sensorimotor experience, rather than pure sensory or pure 
motor experience, is the critical type of experience for altering mirror system properties. 
Incompatible sensorimotor training, where participants performed a hand response to a foot 
stimulus and a foot response to a hand stimulus, was compared to compatible sensorimotor 
training (hand stimulus – hand response; foot stimulus – foot response). Incompatible 
sensorimotor training resulted in a reversal of the normal dominance for hand over foot 
actions during action observation in the mirror system (premotor and parietal cortices). Since 
both groups received equal sensory and motor experience of the movements, this study 
confirmed the importance of sensorimotor learning in modifying mirror system responses.  
 
Transcranial magnetic stimulation 
Studies using single-pulse TMS have revealed that the human mirror system matches 
observed with executed actions at a remarkably high level of specificity. Single-pulse TMS to 
the primary motor cortical representation of a muscle produces a motor-evoked potential 
(MEP) in that muscle. Passive observation of an action increases the size of MEPs in 
precisely those muscles that would be involved in performance of the observed action, 
demonstrating increased activity of those muscles as a result of action observation (e.g. 
Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995; Strafella & Paus, 2000). However, only two 
TMS studies have investigated the role that experience of action observation and execution 
plays in modulating MEPs during action observation.  
 
In the first study, by D’Ausilio, Altenmuller, Olivetti and Lotze (2006), amateur pianists were 
asked to learn the left hand part of a piece of piano music. MEPs from a left hand muscle 
were measured before and after the learning period, while participants were listening to either 
the piano piece or a control flute piece. After the learning period, there was a significant 
increase in MEP size when participants listened to the learned piece but not to the control 
piece. This result suggests that the auditory-motor experience received during practice 
established sensorimotor associations between the sound of the piece and left hand muscle 
activity. However, this conclusion is not secure because the participants did not listen to the 
flute piece during the training period, and therefore auditory experience of the two pieces was 
not controlled.   
 
In the second study, Catmur et al. (2007) showed specifically that sensorimotor experience 
can reverse the perceptual-motor matching properties of the mirror system.  The participants 
in this study were given incompatible sensorimotor training in which the observation of an 
index finger movement was followed by the performance of a little finger movement, and 
vice versa. Compared with controls, who received compatible training, the incompatibly 
trained participants showed a reversal of the muscle-specific enhancement of MEP size 
during action observation.  For example, after incompatible training, MEPs in the little finger 
muscle were larger when observing index finger movements than when observing little finger 
movements. Since the control and incompatible training groups saw the action stimuli and 
performed the responses with equal frequency, this reversal must have been due to the 
contingency between observation and execution experienced by the incompatible training 
group, i.e. to sensorimotor learning. 
 
Implications 
The correspondence problem is at the heart of imitation.  Any system that can imitate must 
have a way of translating perceptual input into matching motor output.  The studies reviewed 
in this paper suggest that the correspondence problem is solved, not by specialised, innate 
cognitive processes, but by sensorimotor learning.  This hypothesis, generated by the ASL 
model of imitation (Heyes & Ray, 2000), is consistent with the results of recent behavioural 
studies showing that animals can imitate a range of simple body movements, that infants 
begin to imitate only when they have had the opportunity to learn the appropriate 
sensorimotor contingencies, and that automatic imitation in human adults can be enhanced, 
abolished and reversed by sensorimotor experience.  Given the evidence, presented here and 
in previous studies, that imitation depends on the mirror system, this hypothesis is also 
supported by research using fMRI and TMS showing that experience, and especially 
sensorimotor experience, modulates the action matching properties of the mirror system. 
 
The ASL theory of the origins of imitation and the mirror system is related in a number of 
ways to each of the principal targets of contemporary research in this field; to questions about 
the evolution, development and intentional control of imitation.  With respect to evolution, 
the ASL theory clearly implies continuity between the imitative abilities of human and 
nonhuman animals.  It suggests that phylogenetically ancient mechanisms of associative 
learning solve the correspondence problem in humans and in a wide range of other taxa 
(Huber et al., 2009; Whiten, McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini, & Hopper, 2009).  It also suggests 
that the imitative abilities of other animals are constrained, not by the absence of cognitive 
processes adapted for solution of the correspondence problem, but by the limited amount of 
sensorimotor experience received by other animals in the course of their development.  Much 
of the sensorimotor, imitogenic experience of human infants and children comes from 
sociocultural sources that are not normally available to other animals; from intensive face-to-
face interaction with adults, from mirrors, and from the kind of play, dance and exercise 
programmes that encourage and reward synchronous action.  Therefore, the ASL theory 
predicts that, if nonhuman animals were given this kind of experience – using training 
procedures carefully designed to accommodate species-specific perceptual, attentional and 
motor characteristics – they would develop the capacity to imitate the trained actions. 
 
Although the ASL theory denies that there are cognitive processes dedicated to solving the 
correspondence problem, it allows that biological evolution may have contributed to human 
imitative competence, not only by providing basic mechanisms of associative learning, but 
also by enhancing input mechanisms (Heyes, 2003); processes that increase the range and 
volume of sensorimotor experience received in the course of development.  The canalised 
Hebbian learning hypothesis (del Giudice, Manera & Keysers, 2009) makes a nonspecific 
proposal of this kind: it suggests that the perceptual and motor characteristics of human 
infants have been favoured by natural selection, not because they promote the development of 
imitation or the mirror system specifically, but because they facilitate the acquisition of 
visuomotor control. The ASL theory is also compatible with the suggestion that imitation 
contributes to a cultural inheritance system (Shea, 2009), but it adds a twist to this proposal.  
If the ASL model is correct, human imitation is not only a channel, but also a product, of 
cultural inheritance.    
 
Turning from evolution to development, the ASL theory is obviously congruent with research 
showing that the ontogeny of imitation in infancy depends on experience (Jones, 2009), and 
with the suggestion that, like imitation, emotional simulation depends on Hebbian learning 
(Bastiaansen et al., 2009).  However, the Hebbian hypothesis (Keysers & Perrett, 2004) and 
the ASL hypothesis (Heyes & Ray, 2000) are not identical.  The former implies that the 
learning that gives rise to imitation and the mirror system depends exclusively on contiguity – 
on observing and executing the same action at the same time – whereas the latter suggests 
that contingency – experiencing a predictive relationship between observation and execution 
– is also important (Cook, Press, Dickinson, & Heyes, under review). This distinction may 
prove critical as further attempts are made to estimate the extent and timing of the imitogenic 
experience received in the course of typical human ontogeny. Over time, the execution of any 
given action is likely to be paired with observation of a range of other actions, but there will 
be a strong contingent relationship between the execution and observation of the same action, 
due to the sources of experience detailed above.  Therefore, a sensorimotor learning 
mechanism, based on contiguity and contingency, is more likely than a Hebbian learning 
mechanism, based on contiguity alone, to yield matching vertical associations, rather than to 
link e.g. a motor representation of hand opening with perceptual representations of a range of 
stimuli. 
 
The ideomotor account of imitation apparently stresses a third principle, neither contiguity 
nor contingency, but similarity (Massen & Prinz, 2009), giving the misleading impression 
that the ideomotor and ASL models are in conflict (Brass & Heyes, 2005).  In fact, they differ 
only in emphasis.  Ideomotor theory focuses on the on-line control of imitation – on the way 
in which common codes function once they have become established, whereas the ASL 
model is also concerned with the origins of these common codes or matching vertical 
associations.  However, the ideomotor theory assumes that common codes originate in 
sensorimotor learning based on contiguity and contingency (Elsner & Hommel, 2004), and, 
in a complementary way, the ASL theory assumes that, once they have been learned, 
matching vertical associations function on the basis of similarity or, as it is called in the 
literature on associative learning, stimulus generalisation (Pearce, 1987); the degree to which 
an incoming stimulus excites the sensory component of a matching vertical association 
depends on the degree of physical similarity between the incoming stimulus and the stimulus 
represented by the sensory component (Press et al., 2005). 
  
The ASL model may also appear to represent a departure from other views regarding the on-
line control of imitative behaviour.  Whereas most contemporary theories emphasise the 
importance of mindsets (van Baaren, Janssen, Chartrand, & Dijksterhuis, 2009), or of 
strategic (Rumiati et al., 2009), intentional (Massen & Prinz, 2009) or rational (Gergely, 
Bekkering, & Kiraly, 2002) processes in guiding imitative behaviour, the ASL model stresses 
automaticity; it suggests that, once a vertical association has been formed between a sensory 
and a motor representation of action, activation of the sensory component inevitably results in 
activation of the motor component (Heyes & Bird, 2007).  In fact, however, the ASL model is 
wholly compatible with the guidance of imitative performance by higher-level cognitive 
processes: it simply suggests that these processes are extrinsic with respect to the core 
mechanisms of imitation, those that solve the correspondence problem.  For example, the 
ASL model suggests that the imitation inhibition mechanisms identified by Brass et al. (2009) 
may prevent imitation by reducing the probability that the sensory component of a vertical 
association will be activated, or by inhibiting the behavioural consequences of activation of 
the motor component, but not by interfering directly with the propagation of activation from 
the sensory to the motor component of a vertical association.   
 
The ASL theory is supported by a range of recent findings in cognitive neuroscience and in 
cognitive, developmental, comparative and social psychology.  These studies, reviewed in 
this paper, suggest that the clever capacity to imitate is based on dumb associative learning.  
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Table 1 
RESPONSE 
TASK-IRRELEVANT STIMULUS 
Index finger 
 
Movement to left 
Little finger 
 
Movement to right 
Index finger 
 
Movement to right 
Little finger 
 
Movement to left 
Index finger 
 
Movement to left 
Imitatively 
compatible 
 
Spatially 
compatible 
Imitatively 
incompatible 
 
Spatially 
incompatible 
Imitatively 
compatible 
 
Spatially 
incompatible 
Imitatively 
incompatible 
 
Spatially 
compatible 
Little finger 
 
Movement to 
right 
Imitatively 
incompatible 
 
Spatially 
incompatible 
Imitatively 
compatible 
 
Spatially 
compatible 
Imitatively 
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Table 1.  Stimuli presented (columns) and responses made (rows) in trials of each type.  
Different shading is used to indicate the four principal trial types: spatially compatible, 
imitatively compatible; spatially compatible, imitatively incompatible; spatially incompatible, 
imitatively compatible; spatially incompatible, imitatively incompatible. Imitative 
compatibility refers to the identity of the finger making the movement (index or little), while 
spatial compatibility refers to the direction of the movement (to the left or right). Note that 
responses were always made with the right hand.  
Figure captions 
Figure 1.  An example of two successive trials in the automatic imitation task. A blank screen 
was followed by a neutral hand stimulus on which the eventual location of the coloured circle 
was indicated by a white outline of a circle. The coloured circle instructing the response 
appeared at the same time as the irrelevant finger action stimulus. For participants given 
orange > index finger and purple > little finger stimulus-response mappings, the first trial is 
spatially and imitatively compatible, while the second is spatially compatible but imitatively 
incompatible. Prior to theta burst stimulation, 144 baseline trials were presented in two 
blocks (preceded by 24 practice trials). After theta burst stimulation, 288 trials were 
presented in four blocks. Each of the four trial types (as listed in Table 1) was presented an 
equal number of times in each block in a pseudo-random order. 
 
Figure 2. Mean ± SEM of automatic imitation effects (RT in imitatively incompatible – RT in 
imitatively compatible trials) for spatially compatible and spatially incompatible trials in each 
of the three rTMS conditions. 
 
Figure 3.  Illustration of the delay hypothesis. ‘SC’ and ‘SI’ indicate time of response 
selection in spatially compatible and spatially incompatible trials, respectively. As time (left 
to right along the x axis) passes after the onset of the irrelevant movement stimulus, the 
automatic imitation effect builds up and then declines. In the baseline condition (solid line), 
the perceptual-motor translation process is not delayed and therefore the build-up begins 
immediately; in the rTMS to IFG condition (dashed line), the translation process is delayed 
and thus the build-up of the automatic imitation effect begins later. ‘SC’ and ‘SI’ represent 
the time points at which responses are selected in spatially compatible and spatially 
incompatible trials, respectively. In the baseline condition (solid line), response selection at 
both of these times will result in automatic imitation effects of similar sizes. However, in the 
delayed IFG condition (dashed line), response selection in spatially compatible trials (early) 
will result in a smaller automatic imitation effect than response selection in spatially 
incompatible trials (late). 
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